A l’approche du prochain Conseil européen qui se devra d’étudier la 3eme voie, les 8 ministres de l’énergie viennent d’adresser au Financial Times, une lettre argumentant leurs propositions.

Que dit-elle ? Rien de bien nouveau pour nos lecteurs assidus. La Troisième voie se construit autour de deux principes pragmatiques que nous avons largement développés ici :


                 Indépendance stricte des GRT + régulation des investissements

Ici, nous apprécions cette prise de position claire et publique. Elle dénote favorablement  de la pratique jusqu’ici usitée par certains de la Commission qui n’avaient, semble t-il, pas hésité à troubler le jeu en trompant des journalistes du Financial Times (voir article précédent)...

Sir,

The 27 European Union member states have been discussing new proposals by the Commission for a more integrated as well as efficient electricity and gas market. Most of its proposals are in the right direction of organised competition supervised through better regulation or harmonised best practices throughout Europe. Networks’ independence is clearly of the utmost importance: electricity and gas must freely flow from the producer to the consumer without infrastructure operators taking advantage of their natural monopoly. Hence there must be strong guarantees on two aspects: access to networks and investment decisions.

We deplore the fact that debate has focused mainly on ownership unbundling – a formal obligation that prohibits the shareholder in transmission activities from involvement in generation or supply – at the expense of in-depth questioning about the energy market’s future. Making this specific method of unbundling compulsory prompts companies to spin off and therefore infringes on property rights. Convincing evidence of the reform’s benefits and conclusive impact studies were never produced.

As a result, many member states have balked at the prospect: how could spin-offs foster investment? What is the point of such a restrictive measure for such hypothetical benefits? On the contrary, we wish to make things move forward with the pragmatism that has so often inspired European construction. We are committed to framing a proposal now in the hands of the Commission, the European parliament and the Council. The aim is the same as the initial package: an effective and efficient unbundling of the transport system operator. Yet the method is quite different: member states must be given the choice of ownership unbundling or structural separation combined with reinforced regulation, and address these issues in an unbiased way.

First, would vertically integrated companies be suspected of a conflict of interest? We suggest strict control of the respective powers of the operator and its shareholders. Network operators and their managers are to be fully independent. We would also like to impose complete transparency on the decision-making process and suggest involving the competent regulatory body to that effect. Second, should investments come too late or be inadequate? Without making the shareholding structure responsible as such, we want to ensure that the investments required for the functioning of an efficient market will not be rejected by an integrated company. They will be planned according to producer and consumer needs and supervised by the competent regulatory body.

Our proposal – the effective and efficient unbundling of network operators – is based on the two vital pillars of independence and investments, without which neither our security of supply nor beneficial competition for all can be guaranteed.

Martin Bartenstein, Austria

Petar Dimitrov, Bulgaria

Michael Glos, Germany

Jean-Louis Borloo, France

Christos Folias, Greece

Jeannot Krecke, Luxembourg

Kaspars Gerhards, Latvia

Lubomir Jahnatek, Slovakia